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ABSTRACT 
 
Managerial ownership and firm performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only 
partly observed) changes in the firm’s contracting environment. To develop the testable hypothesis 
the extension of the cross-sectional results runed by Demesetz and Lehn (1985) (Journal of Political 
Economy, 93, 1155-1177) has been used and the panel data been used to show that managerial 
ownership is explained by key variables in the contracting environment in a way consistent with the 
predictions of principal-agent models. A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial 
ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, after controlling both for 
observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects; it cannot be concluded (econometrically) that 
changes in managerial ownership agent firm performance. 
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Introduction 
 
The conflict between managers and shareholders 
has been studied extensively by the researchers 
seeking to understand the nature of firms since 
Berle and Means (1932). When shareholders are 
too diffusing to monitor managers, corporate assets 
can be used for the benefit of managers rather than 
for maximizing shareholder wealth. It is well 
known that a solution to this problem is to give 
managers an equity stake in the firm. Doing so 
helps to resolve the moral hazard problem by 
aligning managerial interests with shareholders’ 
interests. Therefore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggest that managers with small levels of 
ownership fail to maximize shareholder wealth 
because they have an incentive to consume 
perquisites.  
 
To document the extent to which the contracting 
environment endogenously determines managerial 
ownership, one can extend the empirical 
specification used by Demsetz and Lehn by 
including a number of additional explanatory 
variables other than stock price variability (see also 
Kole, 1996). Most importantly, variables (such as 
firm size, capital intensity, R&D intensity, 
advertising intensity, cash flow, and investment 
rate) designed also can be included to control the 
scope of moral hazard. To the extent that additional 
explanatory variables proxy for moral hazard, and 
specification clarifies the role of stock price 
variance as an explanatory variable for managerial 
ownership. 
 
One can also use the panel data that allows to 
estimate the importance of unobserved (time-
invariant) firm effects. These results show that a 
large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in 
managerial ownership is “explained” by 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. In the analysis of 
the determinants of firm value, one can argue that 
this unobserved heterogeneity generates a spurious 
correlation between ownership and performance. 
 
The goal of this paper is to examine theoretical 
explanations and development of testable 
hypothesis of the empirical link between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. 
Morck et al. (1988) estimate a piecewise-linear 
relation between board ownership and Tobin’s Q 
and found that Tobin’s Q increase and then 
decreases with managerial ownership. McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) examine a larger data set than 
the Fortune 500 firms examined by Morck et al. 
and find an inverted U-shaped relation between 
Tobin’s Q and managerial ownership up to a stake 
of 1%; the relation is negative in the ownership 
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range of 1-5%, becomes positive again in the 
ownership range of 5-20%, and turns negative for 
ownership levels exceeding 20%. 
 
The pattern identified by Morck et al. has been 
corroborated for a cross-section of U.S. firm size 
can account for the reported differences between 
those studies. These studies generally interpreted 
the positive relation at low levels of managerial 
ownership as evidence of incentive alignment, and 
the negative relation at high level of managerial 
ownership as evidence that managers become 
“entrenched” and can indulge in non-value-
maximizing activities without being disciplined by 
shareholders. However, these studies do not 
address the endogeneity problem that confronts the 
use of managerial ownership as an explanatory 
variable, a problem noted early by Jensen and 
Warner (1988, p.13).  
 
The notion of Managerial Ownership: 
 
Referring specifically to profit-oriented, large firms 
in the legal form of corporations, the term 
"Managerial Ownership" can be used as follows: it 
is the totality of the institutional and organizational 
mechanisms, and the corresponding decision-
making, intervention and control rights, which 
serve to resolve conflicts of interest between the 
various groups which have a stakes in a firm and 
which, either in isolation or in their interaction, 
determine how important decisions are taken in a 
firm, and ultimately also determine which 
decisions are taken (Schmidt & Tyrell, 1997, p. 
168, based on Williamson, 1985, p. 298-325).  
 
Conventional Views of the Managerial 
Ownership Problem 
 
The narrow view 
 
According to the narrow view, which Margaret 
Blair (1995, p. 12) calls "the finance model", a 
large public corporation is the property of its 
shareholders. There are many shareholders who 
have lack of knowledge that needed to run the firm 
and who could never reconcile their differing views 
and interests. In the ideal case, the firm is run by 
the managers in exactly the same way as the 
owners would run it if they knew how to do it. Of 
course, real managers have interests of their own 
and are also aware that it is difficult for the owners 
to monitor them. This gives rise to what can call 
the narrow view of the Managerial Ownership 
problem: How can managers be made to act in such 
a way that, to the greatest extent possible, their 
actions are in the interest of the current 
shareholders of a corporation?  
 
There are two well-known answers to this question. 
One is the Anglo-Saxon answer. It amounts to 
saying that there is a market for corporate control, 
which does the trick: The permanent threat that 
some other management team could take over the 
company should motivate the incumbent managers 
to prevent a hostile take-over (Schmidt, 1989; von 
Thadden, 1990). They will best be able to defend 
their position if they make a take-over attempt as 
difficult, and notably as expensive, as possible. 
This can be done by raising the share price as high 
as possible, which is exactly what the shareholders 
would wanted them to do.  
 
The other answer, which would be more in the 
spirit of continental European economic systems, is 
that mechanisms like supervisory boards, duties of 
care and loyalty, reputation, financial incentives, 
peer pressure, etc., can be put in place and made to 
operate in such a way that in principle managers 
will act in the shareholders' interests (Roe, 1994).  
 
The broader view 
 
It is not self evident that firms should or can always 
be run solely in the interest of their (present) 
shareholders. Instead of a one-sided shareholder 
orientation, one could advocate a pluralistic 
concept of "stakeholder orientation". Or one could 
argue that a large firm is more than just an 
association of its shareholders and that we should 
distinguish between the loyalty which the managers 
owe the corporation as a legal entity composed of 
all shareholders on the one side and, on the other, 
the loyalty which they owe the firm as an economic 
and social entity composed of all stakeholders 
including shareholders as well as important 
lenders, core employees, long-term clients and 
suppliers, the local community and even the 
respective nation or country. This is the common 
view of the advocates of a "stakeholder 
orientation", and it can also be found in relevant 
legal doctrines (Schmidt & Spindler, 1997, and 
Blair, 1995, p. 235). Evidently, in this context other 
constituencies would have a role to play at least in 
the sense of their interests being relevant from a 
nonnative point of view and also of them having at 
least a certain active role to play. One aspect is that 
the role or task of deciding "fairly" how much 
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weight should be assigned to the different 
stakeholders' interests would fall to the managers 
and enhance the power, which they in any case 
have. The second aspect is that even though 
managers are considered as being accountable to 
several groups of stakeholders, there is still a need 
to limit their discretionary powers, which they 
could use to promote their own interests. 
 
Managerial Ownership and Performance 
 
Policy formulation would be most readily assisted 
by evidence on the direct relation between 
governance and competitiveness. The equivalent of 
reduce form relation, which identifies the effect of 
changing governance on performance, what is 
generally regarded as the bottom line of the 
governance debate. However, such a relation is 
extremely difficult to uncover. The range of 
factors, which bear on cross-firm or cross-country 
variations in performance, is considerable. This 
does not stop many from equating differences in 
economic performance between, for example, 
Germany and the UK to their different forms of 
corporate governance. Indeed, the origins of the 
long-standing debate on governance can be 
attributed to associations of this sort. 
 
A particular focus with which this analysis is 
concerned is the interaction among competition, 
governance and performance. The interaction is 
important for several reasons. Firstly, the 
effectiveness of different types of governance 
systems may be influenced by the degree of 
product market competition. Secondly, forms of 
corporate governance may be affected by degrees 
of product market competition. It has been 
suggested (see Mayer 1988, Petersen and Ranjan 
1995) that the persistence of close relations 
between firms and financial institutions may rely 
on limitations in financial market competition.  
 
The view that there are important interactions 
between governance and competition leads to the 
systems approach to governance as advanced most 
forcibly by Aoki (1994a). According to this, the 
governance of companies must consider in the 
context of the overall structure of economies. 
Differences across countries in the structure of 
capital market and product market are all closely 
interlinked. “The main bank system and the 
imperfect labor market situations do not exist 
independently, but together form a cluster of 
complementary institutions” (Aoki (1994b), p. 19). 
It is not therefore possible to consider significant 
changes in one independent of the others. In 
particular, policies, which promote the adoption of 
specific forms of governance, have to take account 
of the product and labor markets context within 
they are being contemplated. 
 
Literature Review 
 
The first potential effect of governance that will be 
considered is on incentives. Principal- agent 
models suggest that to align interests of 
shareholders and managers, there should be a close 
relation between executive remuneration and 
corporate performance measured in particular by 
the value of a firm. Empirical analysis of the 
relation between executive pay and corporate 
performance has a long history. Much of this work 
has focused on the relative importance of profits 
and size of company on managerial remuneration 
(see Murphy (1985) and the survey by Rosen 
(1992) in the US and by Conyon, Gregg and 
Machin (1995) in the UK). These analyses find a 
weak relation between pay and performance (a 
$3.25) increase in CEO wealth for every $1,000 
increase in shareholder wealth according to Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) and a stronger relation with the 
size of the firm.  
 
These results were instrumental in promoting the 
view that management will be more concerned 
with the growth than the profitability of firms. 
However, more recent work has suggested the 
observed relations between pay and performance 
may not be out of line with those predicted by 
principal-agent models. Haubrich (1994) 
demonstrates that a $10 increase in remuneration 
for every $1,000 increase in shareholder value is 
quite consistent with certain parameter values 
regarding risk aversion, effort-leisure trade-offs 
etc. Similarly Garen (1994) argues that the Jensen 
and Murphy results cannot be viewed as 
inconsistent with the principal-agent theory. 
Alternatively, weak relations between pay and 
performance can be interpreted in the context of 
tournament theories (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) 
where rewards come in the form of promotion to 
senior levels rather than a relation between 
remuneration and corporate performance.  
 
Over the last few years there has been a substantial 
increase in the use of options as a form of 
executive remuneration. Options are a method of 
"gearing up" the relation between remuneration and 
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performance. Since executive remuneration only 
rises above the exercise price, powerful relations 
between pay and performance can be established 
for given levels of expected remuneration. 
However, remuneration is also then more directly 
related to volatility of performance than with share 
schemes (Main, 1995) and executives may be 
encouraged to pursue unduly risk strategies to 
activate their share options. In addition, option 
contracts present serious problems of self-dealing 
by which managers sign contracts from which they 
anticipate earning substantial returns. For example, 
Yermack (1995) reports that managers receive 
stock options shortly before shares appreciate in 
value.  
 
There has been little analysis of the influence of 
governance arrangements on executive pay. 
Conyon (1994) finds that the incidence of 
remuneration committees has increased appreciably 
in the UK. In a longitudinal analysis of 214 large 
UK companies, he finds that there were 
remuneration committees in 94% of companies in 
1993 as against 54% in 1988. He estimates that 
these committees have been associated with a 2% 
reduction in CEOs' payment. However, Main and 
Johnston (1993) find that remuneration committees 
are associated with higher levels of remuneration, 
of 17%, and remuneration was no more incentive 
oriented with than without a committee.  
 
It has been suggested that outside of the UK and 
US, managers are more concerned about the 
growth than the profitability of firms (see for 
example Blinder, 1991). Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992) argue, "Japanese firms are not run in the 
interests of their shareholders" (p 443). Similar 
points have been made about Germany (see, for 
example, Schneider-Lenne (1994)). On the other 
hand, Grundfest (1990), Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein (1990, 1991) and Prowse (1990) argue 
that close relationships reduce agency costs in 
Japan and allow investors to monitor management 
more effectively than in the US.  
 
Kaplan (1994) compares the relation between 
executive remuneration (salary and bonus) and 
performance as measured by earnings levels, 
changes in earnings and sales growth in large 
Japanese and US companies in the 1980s. Kaplan 
concludes that Japanese "compensation respond to 
all four performance measures, and the responses 
are generally similar to those in the United States. 
Cash compensation is positively related to 
earnings, stock and sales performance. In most 
cases, the sensitivities in the two countries are not 
statistically different." (p 512)  
 
The relation between corporate governance and 
executive remuneration is therefore unclear. 
Superficially, the stock market economies of the 
UK and US offer the opportunity of providing 
higher-powered incentives in the form of, for 
example, managerial stock options. Close 
monitoring by investors and well functioning 
remuneration committees should promote stronger 
relations between pay and performance in Germany 
and Japan. Thus far, the empirical evidence to 
support these propositions has not been 
forthcoming.  
 
The review has examined the influence of 
corporate governance systems on managerial 
incentives and disciplining, the restructuring of 
firms, finance and investment, commitment and 
trust. It has noted that the relation between 
corporate governance systems and both incentives 
and disciplining is far from clear. Superficially, 
there would appear to be a difference between the 
high-powered incentive arrangements in the UK 
and US and those in Germany and Japan. However, 
the limited evidence available to date does not 
support that assertion. Likewise, while the 
disciplining system associated with a market for 
corporate control in the UK would appear to be 
quite different from supervisory boards in 
Germany, the mechanism by which discipline is 
actually imposed is quite similar in the two 
countries, namely concentrated shareholdings and 
markets in partial share stakes. Neither carrots nor 
sticks appear to be fundamental differences 
between financial systems.  
 
Methodology 
 
As mentioned the extension of the cross-sectional 
results runed by Demesetz and Lehn (1985) 
(Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177) has 
been used to develop the testable hypothesis and 
the panel data used to show that managerial 
ownership is explained by key variables in the 
contracting environment in ways consistent with 
the predictions of principal-agent models. 
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Determinants of Managerial Ownership and 
Corporate Performance 
 
Determinants of Managerial Ownership 
 
A common approach for estimating the impact of 
managerial ownership on firm value is to regress 
Tobin’s Q on such variables as the percentage of 
equity held by managers. But it also could argue 
that this regression is potentially misspecified 
because of the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. Specifically, if some of the 
unobserved determinants of Tobin’s Q are also 
determinants of managerial ownership, then 
managerial ownership might spuriously appear to 
be a determinant of firm performance. To motivate 
the focus on the endogeneity of managerial 
ownership, it is possible to provide three examples 
of likely sources of unobservable heterogeneity, 
and in each case; it follows their econometric 
consequences for cross-sectional regressions. This 
discussion can be followed by a more formal 
example where the assumption is made that the 
unobserved heterogeneity is a “firm fixed effect”, 
and under this assumption panel data can be used 
to mitigate the endogeneity problem.  
 
For the first example of unobserved heterogeneity, 
consider two firms that are identical except that the 
owner of one firm has access to a superior 
monitoring technology. Under the optimal 
contracting regime, the owners with access to the 
superior monitoring technology will chose a lower 
level of managerial ownership to align incentives, 
and this firm will have a higher valuation because 
fewer resources will be diverted to managerial 
perquisites. If measures of the quality of the 
monitoring technology are omitted from the 
specification, a regression of firm value on 
managerial ownership will spuriously (and falsely) 
indicate a negative relation, because ownership is a 
negative proxy for the quality of monitoring 
technology. 
 
Intangible assets provide a second example of 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Suppose two firms 
are identical except that one of the firms operates 
with a higher fraction of its assets in the form of 
intangibles. Under the optimal contracting regime, 
the owners of this firm will require a higher level 
of managerial ownership to align incentive because 
the intangible assets are harder to monitor and 
therefore subject to managerial discretion. This 
firm will also have a higher Q value because the 
market will value intangibles in the numerator 
(market value), but the book value of assets in the 
denominator will understate the value of 
intangibles (because Tobin’s Q is measured as the 
ratio of the market value of the firm’s outstanding 
debt and equity divided by the book value of 
assets). In this example, the unobserved level of 
intangible induces a positive correlation between 
managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q, but this 
relation is spurious, not causal.  
 
The third example of unobserved heterogeneity is 
variation in the degree of market power. Suppose 
there are two firms compete in a market with 
differentiated products and one firm enjoys a 
competitive advantage because (for some historical 
reason) it has been able to locate its products in 
such a way that confers more market power. If this 
market power insults managerial decision-making 
forms then the optimal contract for managers will 
call for higher levels of managerial ownership. 
Hence, unobserved heterogeneity in the form of 
unobserved differences in market power will 
(spuriously) induce a positive relation between 
ownership and performance. Alternatively, 
causation could run the other; attempting to test 
this proposition using regressions of Tobin’s Q on 
managerial ownership suffers form the same 
econometric problems that is studied here. The 
ownership decision is endogenous because of 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
 
It is possible to generalize these examples in a 
simple analytical framework. The assumption can 
be made that within the general set of contracts 
agreed to by the firm, the owners of the firm chose 
a simple management compensation contract that 
includes a share of the firm’s equity. This equity 
share (or managerial stake) is chosen to maximize 
the owners’ equity return subject to incentive 
compatibility and participation constraints. For this 
purpose, an assumption can be drawn that gains 
from other means for reducing agency costs have 
been maximized, so that we examine the residual 
agency cost to be addressed by managerial owner-
ship. Let xit and uit respectively; denote observable 
and unobservable characteristics for firm i at the 
time t related to the firm’s contracting environment 
(including, e.g. proxies for the potential for moral 
hazard). In addition to unobserved firm 
characteristics, we implicitly assume a profitability 
shock that is observable to the manager, but not to 
outside shareholders. This shock cannot be 
contracted upon and rise the moral hazard. 
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The firm’s owners must decide how much equity to 
give to managers in order to align incentives for 
value maximization. This equity share mit depends 
on such factors as the potential for moral hazard 
and managers’ exposure to risk, which we assume 
are partly measured by xit but are otherwise 
unobserved and included in uit. If it is assumed that 
the function relation is liner, and that uit = ui  is the 
time-variant for the firm, so that 
 
mit  = β1xit + y1ui + eit  (1) 
 
Where eit represents independent measurement 
error. 
 
Faced with this contract, managers choose an 
optimal “effort level”, y1, which could include a 
range of participation in non-value-maximizing 
activities. This effort choice depends on the 
managerial ownership stake, mit , and, like the 
optimal contract itself, depends on both observed 
and unobserved characteristics of the firm, xit and 
ui. Assuming a linear functional form, we can 
represent the manager’s effort choice by the 
following relation: 
 
yit  = θmit + β2xit + y2ui + vit (2) 
 
Using the firm value as a summary measure of 
expected firm performance, here we assumed that 
firm value depends on managerial effort plus the 
vector of observed and unobserved firm 
characteristics, we can write denoting the value of 
firm i at time t by Qit: 
 
Qit  = δyit + β3xit + y3ui + wit  (3) 
 
We can now combine Eqs. (2) and (3) to derive the 
following relation among firm managerial 
ownership, firm characteristics, and firm 
performance: 
 
Qit  =δθmit+(δβ2+β3) xit+(δy2+y3)ui+δvit+wit (4) 
 
Simplifying the notation reveals the regression 
specification commonly used in the empirical 
literature: 
 
Qit  = a0+ a1mit +a2xit + εit  (5) 
 
In a cross-section of firms, as long as the error 
term, εit = (δy2 + y3)ui + δvit + wit is uncorrelated 
with both mit  and xit, one can consistently estimate 
the reduced-form coefficient on managerial 
ownership in the regression form firm value. 
However, because the choice of managerial 
ownership depends on unobserved firm 
characteristics, mit depends on uit and is therefore 
correlated with εi, specifically, 
 
E(mit εit) = E(( β1xit + y1ui ) (δy2 + y3)ui) =y1(δy2 + 
y3)σ2v. (6) 
 
In general, the expectation in Eq. (6) will be zero 
only in the unlikely event that the optimal contract 
does not depend on observed firm characteristics 
(y1 = 0), or in the event that neither effort nor Qit  
do (y2=y3=0). Hence one cannot estimate Eq. (5) 
using ordinary least squares. A natural solution to 
this problem would be to use instrumental variable 
for ownership, but this approach is difficult in 
practice because the natural instruments – the 
observed firm characteristics xit are already 
included on the right-hand side of the equation for 
firm valuation in Eq. (5). Hence it is difficult to 
identify instrumental variables that would permit 
identification of a1, with panel data, however, one 
can use a fixed-effects estimator, assuming that the 
unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time. 
 
In contrast to the model for Tobins’ Q, the model 
for the optimal choice of managerial ownership 
levels in Eq. (1) is more easily identified because it 
requires only the much weaker assumption that the 
unobserved firm characteristics are uncorrelated 
with observed characteristics. 
 
The above discussion suggests us for four lines of 
empirical inquiry. First, one can explore whether 
the observed firm characteristics (proxies for the 
potential for moral hazard and risk) influence 
managerial ownership in ways that are consistent 
with theoretical predictions. Second, one can 
investigate the importance of unobserved 
characteristics as determinants of managerial 
ownership. Third, investigate the extent to which 
the empirical relation between managerial 
ownership and firm performance (measured by 
Tobins’ Q) can be explained by the omission of 
observed and unobserved firm characteristics (i.e. 
by uncontrolled for or unobserved heterogeneity). 
Fourth, we explore the possibility of using 
instrumental variables to recover the parameter 
values in Eq. (5).  
 
Determinants of Corporate performance 
 
In the analysis it has been emphasized that 
managerial stakes are part of a larger set of 
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equilibrium contracts undertaken by the firm to 
align incentives for value maximization, and 
derived that managerial ownership can be 
explained by observable characteristics of the 
firm’s contracting environment, such as stock price 
volatility and the composition of assets, as 
predicted by the contracting view. These results 
also show, however, that even when industry 
dummies are included, many important features of 
the firm’s contracting environment remain 
unobserved. 
 
This section is tried to show how panel data 
techniques are used to investigate more directly the 
question of whether managerial ownership can be 
treated as exogenous in the performance 
regressions or not. Here Tobin’s Q is used as 
measure of firm performance. To investigate the 
impact of managerial ownership on Q, variants of 
the reduced-form model in Eq.(3) of previous 
section is used, in which Q depends upon 
managerial ownership, m, observable firm 
characteristics, x, and unobserved firm 
characteristics, u. One also can use two 
specifications of managerial ownership in Tobin’s 
Q regression. The first includes m and m2 
(McConnell and Servase, 1990). The second 
includes three piecewise-linear terms in m (as in 
Morck et. al., 1998). For observable characteristics, 
the same vector of x variable is used in the model 
for managerial ownership. 
 
One can formalize this evidence against the 
exogeneity of managerial ownership by testing for 
a correlation between the fixed effect and 
managerial ownership. In this case one could use 
Hausman (1978) test, but this test would tend to 
over-reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation 
because it would tend to reject if any of the 
explanatory variables were correlated with the 
fixed effect. To reduce Type I error, a more precise 
‘conditional moment’ test can be constructed, 
which is in the spirit of a Hausman test, but tends 
to reject only if managerial ownership is the 
sources of the specification error (Greene, 1997, 
p.534; Newey 1985). 
 
The test is constructed as follows. Let the 
performance model be: 
 
it,iZit0it εuββQ +++=  
 
Where zit includes the managerial ownership 
variables and the x variables described earlier, and 
ui is the firm fixed effect. The formal hypothesis 
that can be test is whether the unobserved fixed 
effect, ui, is correlated with managerial ownership, 
an element of zit. That is, H0: E(mit . ui) = 0, where 
mit is an r x 1 vector of variables measuring the 
effect of managerial ownership. The idea of the test 
is to construct the simple analogue to the 
population moment, s = E(mit, wit),  and then to test 
whether it is statistically significantly different 
from zero. 
 
Using a consistent ‘within’ estimator of β, we can 
construct consistent estimates of the residual wit = 
ui + εit. Our test statistic will be 
∑ ∑= == Ni Tt ,iitit NT/wˆmsˆ 1 1 where Ti is the 
number of observations for firm i. Under standard 
regularity conditions and under the null hypothesis 
that E(mit . ui) = 0, sˆN  will be asymptotically 
distributed N(0, ∑ ). Therefore the statistic 
∑ −= ^ sˆsˆNk 1  is asymptotically chi-squared with 
r degree of freedom, where ∑^  is consistent 
estimate of ∑ (Greene, 1997). 
 
Development of Testable Hypothesis 
 
Hypothesis on Managerial ownership 
 
Regarding the determinants of managerial 
ownership, we can develop the following 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis I: 
There is a higher ownership concentration in small 
companies than larger ones. 
 
The introduction of the panel data approach of the 
problem suggest to consider some effects of the 
firm size variation along the time over the 
ownership structure, we expect to find lower level 
of share ownership in big companies compared to 
small ones; moreover this behavior would continue 
along the time when company’s size increase. The 
wealth constrain that operates across firms is 
expected to persist along the time. 
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Hypothesis II: 
When the size of the firm changes over time, there 
should be an inverse relationship with the level of 
ownership concentration. 
 
The size of companies can be a restriction for some 
categories of shareholders, but other shareholders 
cannot be constrained by the size of their 
investment in a given company. The results of 
Prowse (1992) suggest this hypothesis. Likewise, 
Demestz and Lehn (1985) found higher negative 
relationship for individual shareholders than for 
financial ones. 
 
Hypothesis III: 
The influence of size on the ownership structure is 
expected to be higher for individual investors than 
for holding or financial companies. 
 
All measure of environment instability used by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) was positively related to 
the degree of ownership concentration. Bergstrom 
and Rydqvist (1990) found that ownership 
concentration increase with firm-specific risk. In a 
sub-sample of Prowse (1992) research, three 
measure of profit instability were positively and 
significantly related to ownership concentration. 
 
When the specific risk affects the firms, we can 
differentiate the ownership structure changes. Even 
when the conditions of environment stability are 
changing over time, there would be a response for 
each firm as ownership structure adapts to the new 
situation. 
 
Hypothesis IV: 
Ownership concentration increases along the time 
when more firm specific instability conditions 
appear. 
 
Widespread ownership means that shareholders 
diversify their investments to assume lower 
financial risk levels. A recession may induce firms 
to choose a more dispersed ownership structure as 
a way to lower risk exposure. An increase in the 
economic activity, associated to less uncertainty, 
would imply higher ownership concentration ratios. 
Nevertheless, in the context of separation among 
owners and managers, the alternative hypothesis 
would be that recession induces higher ownership 
concentration to strengthen the internal control 
needed to reduce costs. 
 
 
Hypothesis V: 
The stage of the economic cycle over ownership 
concentration of firms reflects the lower risk 
exposure when the business cycle conditions are 
negative (dispersion) and higher concentration 
ratios when favorable opportunities arise. 
 
Prowse (1992) identifies that financial institutions 
are largely responsible for the positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and profit 
instability in independent firm. We are able to 
determine for different type of shareholders the 
influence of firm specific return’s instability.  
 
The firm belonging to a regulated industry was 
found by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) as an 
explanatory variable for lower degrees of 
ownership concentration. Following their findings, 
we can expect similar results. That is, the 
systematic regulation of a firm by economic 
authorities or public agencies requires lower level 
of monitoring by its owners, and therefore permits 
higher ownership dispersion. Bergstrom and 
Rydqvist (1990) findings support the hypothesis 
that the government subsidies the monitoring of 
management in regulated industries, by introducing 
a dummy variable for financial firms. 
 
Hypothesis VI: 
The level of ownership concentration should be 
lower in firms of regulated sectors than non-
regulated firms. 
 
Hypothesis on Link between Ownership and 
performance: 
 
Under this head, we have tried to develop the 
hypothesis that will help to test the link between 
managerial ownership and corporate performance. 
 
Corporate performance and disciplinary corporate 
governance actions: 
 
To the extent that share price and accounting 
returns are influenced by the quality of managerial 
inputs and actions, they may provide useful 
information on managerial performance (Joskow 
and Rose 1994). 
 
Hypothesis I: 
Disciplining of top management is triggered by 
poor company performance: directors, CEOs, top 
managers and executive chairman are replaced 
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following poor share price performance and/or low 
operating income and net earnings. 
 
The impact of board composition and structure on 
the board’s ability to monitor performance: 
 
The existence of a balanced board including both 
executives and non-executive avoids the 
occurrence of conflicts of interest among decision 
makers and residual risk bearers and reduces the 
transaction or agency costs associated with the 
separation of ownership and control (Williamson 
1983 and 1984). 
 
Hypothesis II: 
The composition of the board of directors 
determines the board’s monitoring capabilities. 
The grater the proportion of non-executive 
directors, the lower potential board domination by 
management and the higher the monitoring ability 
of the non-executive directors as observed in 
turnover of executive directors, of the CEO and of 
the management committee. 
 
Separation of the role of CEO and of non-executive 
chairman is supposed to strengthen the monitoring 
ability of the non-executive directors since a non-
executive chairman could set the agenda of the 
board. 
 
Hypothesis III: 
The separation of the functions of CEO and of 
chairperson of the board facilitates disciplining of 
underperforming management. Therefore, with 
dual control, we would expect to see higher 
turnover. 
 
Ownership concentration, the cost of free riding on 
control and superior monitoring abilities: 
 
Monitoring shareholders pay the costs related to 
their corporate control efforts but they only benefit 
in proportion to their shareholding (Grossman and 
Hart 1980 and 1988, Demsetz 1983) 
 
Hypothesis IV:  
The presence of large shareholdings in the 
ownership structure is positively correlated with 
higher board turnover when performance is poor. 
 
The incentives to monitor and correct managerial 
failure depend not only on the concentration of 
ownership, but also on the monitoring ability of 
different types of major shareholders. Different 
classes of shareholders might have different 
information, monitoring companies and incentives. 
 
Hypothesis V: 
Disciplining the underperformance of management 
is accomplished by large shareholding with 
superior monitoring abilities. 
 
Ultimate ownership and dilution of control: 
 
As ownership structures are frequently complex 
and pyramidal, the question arises as to whether 
decisions about disciplining management of the 
sample company are taken by direct investors (at 
ownership tier 1) or by ‘ultimate shareholders’ who 
control these direct shareholders directly or via 
intermediate companies through multiple tiers of 
ownership. 
 
Hypothesis VI: 
(a) Managerial disciplining decisions are taken by 
the ultimate shareholder. (b) However, when 
controlling stakes are held through multiple tiers of 
ownership and when intermediate shareholdings 
deviate from full ownership. The control exerted by 
the ultimate investor is diluted. 
 
The disciplining role of the market for share stakes: 
 
When performance is poor, a market for share 
stakes may result. Decisions to build up a 
substantial shareholding, to increase a shareholding 
to a critical ownership threshold (e.g. 25% or 50%) 
or to expand a toehold share are motivated by 
future performance improvements after the failing 
management team and/or the board is restructured. 
 
Hypothesis VII: 
In companies without sufficiently large 
shareholders or with shareholders who take a 
passive stance with regard to monitoring, poor 
performance gives rise to changes in the ownership 
pattern. 
 
When a market of share stakes originates from poor 
performance and for control purpose, we might 
expect disciplining of management. 
 
Hypothesis VIII: 
Increases in shareholdings are associated with 
higher managerial and board turnover in the same 
year or the year following the monitors’ 
disciplinary actions. 
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Post-disciplining corporate performance: 
 
For internal and external control mechanisms to be 
effective, the greater incidence of replacement of 
top management and directors should be followed 
by improvement in firm performance. 
 
Hypothesis IX: 
Management and board restructuring triggered by 
poor performance result in improvements of 
company performance. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Firms are governed by a network of relations 
representing contrast for financing, capital 
structure, and managerial ownership and 
compensation, among others. For any of these 
contractual arrangements, it is difficult to identify 
the correspondence between the contractual choice 
and firm performance (e.t., measured by 
accounting rates of return or Tobin’s Q) because 
contractual choices and performance outcomes are 
endogenously determined by exogenous and only 
partly observed features of he firm’s contracting 
environment.  
 
I have confronted this endogeneity problem in the 
context of the firm’s compensation contract with 
managers. Because managerial equity stakes are an 
important and well-known mechanism used to 
align the incentives of managers and owners, we 
examine the determinants of managerial ownership 
as affection of the contracting environment. We 
extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) and use panel data to show that 
managerial ownership is explained by variables 
describing the contracting environment in ways 
consistent with the predictions of principal-agent 
models. 
 
I, theoretically, find that a large fraction of the 
cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership 
is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
This unobserved heterogeneity in the contracting 
environment has important implications for 
econometric models designed to estimate the effect 
of managerial ownership on firm performance. 
Moreover, if one can control both for observed 
firm characteristics and firm fixed effects, it will 
become difficult to conclude that changes in firm 
managerial ownership affect performance. Here the 
instrumental-variables results, however, suggest a 
promising step toward the construction of more 
complete model of the relation between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. 
 
It is expected that if I run empirical model then it 
will help more generally the notion that the firm 
chooses among alternative mechanisms for 
minimizing agency costs. This is, of course, the 
concept articulated in Alchian (1969); Fama 
(1980); Fama and Jensen (1993) and Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985); more recently Crutchley and Hansen 
(1989) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). 
 
Suppose, for example, that Q capitalizes the 
market’s expectation of the effect of agency costs 
on firm value. The loss in value reflects residual 
agency costs, or agency costs remaining after 
corporate control mechanisms are chosen. In 
reducing agency costs include leverage, increased 
reliance on outside directors, large shareholders, 
institutional investors, dividend policy and radical 
changes in corporate control. 
 
Completing the above analysis, two other possible 
strategies are tasks for future research. The first 
involves identifying large, arguably exogenous 
changes in ownership levels arising form shifts in 
tax policy, regulation, or fixed costs in the market 
for corporate control, though care must be taken 
because even certain ‘natural experiments’ are 
endogenous in that they affect performance 
directly. The second involves designing a dynamic 
structural model of firm contracting decisions, 
possibly permitting identification from 
economically reasonable assumptions about 
functional form. This strategy is particularly 
desirable given the lack of easily identified 
instrumental variables. 
 
It is also expected that if we run empirical model 
then our findings will be consistent with the 
proposition that firms chose strategies to reduce 
agency costs optimally over the long run, at least 
two issues remain. First, the simultaneous choice of 
individual mechanisms or some subset needs to be 
modeled; and second, the choice of mechanisms 
likely involves some fixed costs or ‘costs of 
adjustment’ so that firms are not always at their 
long-run contractual optimum. Exploring these 
costs and how they might have changed over time 
for different agency-cost-reducing mechanisms is a 
particularly interesting task for future research. 
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